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IN THE SUPREME Cl1liRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
llELVIN A. con K 
ViANDA G. COOK 
PLAINTIFFS- RESPONDENTS 
vs. 
~:nEL L. Cff1K, et al, 
DEFBWA,\TT - APPELLANT 
APPELLANT 1 S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15311 
Plaintiffs - Respondents, Melvin A, Co0k and Yfa.rida G Conk, his wife, 
bmught an act ion in two c0unts a gaiDst Appellant. One c0unt was to 
:rr-reclose on a mortgage on ~e 0 real J:'roperty of the Appellant. The ResP,ndents 
joined as defendants in this action. Lien holders Vera O. Cook (Baacher): 
Tromson Electrical Co.; Lila A. Co0k, Janis B. Smith and Martin Smith as 
guardians ad litem for Cameron R. J,hn, a minor; and Credit Bureau of Iogan. 
Defendants answered setting forth d1cketed claims. In adiitfon Defendant 
Vera O. Cook c.ross- claimed for supp-,rt payments due since she last dockeded 
a judgment for same. 
In the sec0nd count Plaintiffs - Resp0ndence set forth a claim for rn,~ey 
lend to Appellant, which Appellant derred in his answer, but now concedes ad-
mitting to have paid twenty five hundred of this m"ney to Res]:))ndents in one 
lump sum. 
RELIEF SOUGIIT 
Appellant m>ti1ns f0r a new trial on all issues and bef0re al~ litigants 
and in additinn requests the Court to consider Newly Discovered Evidence • 
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<~.·J..;:~: DISPOSITION IN THE IDWER roURT 1 
The Trial Judge, Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, found that R 
espindent1 
were entitled to foreclose mortgage, and ordered a sale and set forth the 
priorities of lien holders. Additfonally theC,.,urt gra11ted Plaintiffs _ 
Resp:mdents m-,tfrm for partial summary judgment nn thesec-,nd c"unt fl'lr 
m"'ney lent, and granted Co-Defendant Vera O. c,.,,.,k•s cross claim for past 
due support payments. These judgments were added to the list of liens 
against tte Appellant's property. 
Appellant had judgment set-aside for investiga ticn of fraud, The ,judge 
sustained the judgment ruling on affidavits only. A new sherrif sale was 
set and executed, funds distrisuted with notice of need of return of same 





STATEMENT OF FACTS 
. '\ 
Appellant hB'g '1ad difficulty engaging dependable council to represent 
him due to indigent circumstances. On the occation of the foreclosure his 
legal council was rn:>t informed of the facts thus appellant was stipulated 
to facts adverse to his ease and c"ntra ry to his pleadings. 
Appellant is a farmer owning land irrigating 80 acres in Box Elder Cg, 
On llay 22, 1.972 Respcndent loaned i12, 500.00 to J!.ppellant to pay off 
existing debts. This note was re+ired rt:arked "paid" and in lG?J a new note 
was drawn up by Resµmdent for $13,000.00 to be repaid over a ten year period. 
In newly discovered evidence a third and subsequent mortgage was found in 
the form of an extension of time agreement or a new modus operandi. 
Only the second of these mortgages was considered 8efore the court as 
follows: 
Thia mortgage is given to secure the following indebtedness: Note on 
-2-
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1oan to N .L. CC'nk of Thirteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars, said note .carrying 
a date of Way 22, 1972 and carrying a rate "f 6% interest per annum to lte paid 
in ten equal installments at the rate of $1300.00 per year simple interest pay-
able quarterly. 
The Mortgag>r agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on said premises and 
a reas0nable attorney's fee in case of foreclosure. See Resrnndents exhibit "D" 
Thus we see that this Ill"rtgage gave no right to accellerate the payments 
in case of default. 
In 1973 a hail storm totally destroyed the crops of Appellant who at the 
same time was refused further credit by R.esp::mdent in which to purchase needed 
sprinkler equipment. Neither wnuld Res:i::ondent accept full return of the loan 
when tendered by way nf a Federal Land Bank loan. Under these C'">nditions the 
Appellant tried unsuccessfully tn flood irrigate sandy land during 1~73-74. In 
the spring of 1975 Appellant leased his farm for three years. 
In 1974 ResJhndent baned Appellant additi,.,nal funds in which to purchase 
. 
main line _buried and permanent ~" plastic -pipe;,'·~:: ($2,500.00 of which was 
repaid in one lump sum.} The Appellant had also made some interest payments 
on the first loan as shnwn ~y exhibit 
In this time of hardship Resrnndent did not press for payments and refused 
to accept offer of Appellant to return the l'">an in full with all interest in 
1974 and again in 1975. In each case the tender was rejected by Respondent 
when he replied: "No, I don't need the money." 
This failure to require payment C'>ntinued by varinus waivers and refusals 
f,,r another three years. 
On January 8, 1976 in a newly discovered letter from Resrnndent to the 
Appellant he repeated his past lienency by writing: 
"We want y,.,u to clear up all ynur debts as rapidly as P'lSsible and then 
it Will be time enrrngh for you tc start paying us off•" Signed Itel and Wanda. 
Appellant accepted this forebearance acting on it and implementing its 
terms as evidenced sy a large supply of canceled checks to pay farm costs and 
-3-
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pressing oblig;otfons. At the sarr.e time Appellant trusted wnrd of Resi:n~d. l 
. e1t :.:,: I 
they would wait until other credibrs were paid first. A Chattel ll.ortgaRe was ! 
! 
given by Api:;ellant uns...,licited to Respondent as further evirlence of fiis in:en(". 
~, I 
tci complete an equitable settlement of all claims. This was accepted by the 
Respondent in the same spirit. It then becarr.e mandatory for Respondent to sir, 
each and every check frnm the farm prriduction Vlhich he faithfully did from 19'7\ 
thru 1977 handing the check back to Appellant each time saying: "Here, go ?J1rl 
pay other people first." 
During this perfod Appellant had to rely on his W"'>rking wife for h0uoehol~ 
expenses travebng to the far!!l in a 1963 ford pick-up truck using fur.cs onl;i ·:I 
recover from the loi::ses fMm the hail storm and to pay pressing nrites and bills, · 
Even while exercising extreme frugality farm taxes went unpaid for 197~ addinp 
two payments with added costs which were finally n:ade in November of 1977 all 
of which was an added worry to the Appellant. 
Under these conditions creditors whose payments were unfulfilled d~cketed 
. 
Respondents foreclosure or were sued in and "rurnng the fore!1Ylst was his ex-wife, 
Vera o. Cook(Baacher), who has eeen well emplayed at around Jl5,ooo.oo per year, 
Appellant was unable to get other work due tc his age of sixty years and 
the necessity to work during the spring, summer and fall on thefann.The year 
1975 was a go,.,d one as lessee spant his full time on lessors land, but in 1976 
and 1977 production was a disappoinment since lessee tnok the most ofthe water 
frnlil the irrigation well to his adj.,cent la'1d leaving Appellant's land s~<Jrt on 
irrigation water resulting in low production. 
In thelate fall ofl976 the Appellant was jailed for c,..,ntempt for his fail· 
ure to consistentzy pay child support while he claims they were paid at least in 
part for many mnths during this perfod. \Jpcn his release on afternol'ln of 
December 10, 1976 he went directly to obtain council of attorney Omer Call of 
Brigham City who took the case on condition that Appellant w11uld come ll.0 nday 
morning December 13, 1976 and spend the day in preparatfon for the hearing 
which had been moved up from Decerneer 17th to Decern&er 14, 197f, 
-4-
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Resrnndent L'elvin A. Conk did in fact phone Appella""'.t at exactly 6:00 a.m. 
on December lJ, 1976 stating emphatically thus: "THE?.E WILL EE NO FDRECWSURE •• • 
come to Salt Lake City now and I will loan you sixty th,.,usarid chllars t,., be re-
p;r·id in a year by yriur refinancing. Bring your fan:: deed a'ld y,.,ur wife Helen 
as ~he will n l:!ed t0 sign papers." Appellant reSIY'"!ded ¥:ith the f0llowing: 
"That is f(00d news. I don •t have a deed .iust r,ow but I do have ari abstract of 
title frnm which a deed c·1Uld be made." To this the ?.esD-o,dent replied: "Then 
bring that. 11 Appellant said: "I have engaged an at tnrney for the hearing shall 
I release him? II The Re~p-ondent, kelvin a c,-,ok rei:;lied: ''Y"ll rrJfht as well." 
vdthin two h0urs time and at the Cross-road Texico Service Stati,.,:--1 snuth 
intersection in Brigham City Appellant phoned att0:r.iey Call who said: " I'm 
glad to hear that there will b~o foreclosure since I have had nn time to look 
at the case and I am in no way prepared for the trial had it been held t11-
mrrow." 
Appellants then went directly to Respon~ents office in the Beneficial 
• 
Life Tower J 5 South State Street placing theAbstract ofTitle directly in the 
hand of the Resp:mdent who placed it in the right ha!:d drawer of his desk. 
Appellant returned t0 the same office s-ime three weeks later for the express 
purpose of recoverirg his abstract of title and t'-,is ti.'L,e it was located in 
the office of Respondents Attorney accross the hall in the same building. 
Nothing but hollow promises and delaying tactics i::roceeded throughout the 
remainder of the day to the effect that matters so important as had been 
promised needed time to work them out. This Appellant ::learly understcod 
trusting explicitly in a long standing fiduciary relationship with the 
respondent. At length Resv.ndent said his C'>11nc il was in Coalville and 
he had called and w-iuld not beback to Salt Lake u_ntil ll:OO p.m. and it then 
would be necessary for the Appellants to remain overnight at the h'>me of the 
Resinndents for thefirst time in history. His C'lwcil did n,,t ret,Jrn that 
night at all and ab.., 11t 9:00 a.m. December 14, 1976 Res!))ndent announced: "I 
guess there will be a f.-,reclosure afterall." Appellants disbelieving what 
-5-
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seemed omvir,us rushed to Bri.,.ham City C,.,urt oouse enteri·nr: f d -d-:-:----• 
"' . c-,n use , is-,rient 
"1, 
surprised, uninformed as to their le!!!;al rights and entered the cnurthouse Wi'.l-
out council of any kind. 
Of these happenings Respondent has faithfully denied in CCJntinuous effort i 
to defend the judgment he seized that day by circumventi-,n. 
Later Appellant shall deITr>nstrate that basic C'">ntradictions do in fact exist , 
in signed statements by letter and under C'">urt Oath in Respcndents Counter-
Affidavit presented before the c,.,urt of &ix Elder Cnunty l'arch 10, 1978, On 
tl:at occation the District Judge had openly ann,..,unced earlier that judgment 
would be by affidavit only, that testirrnny wrrnld not be allowed mr wnuld the 
I 
Appellant bepermitted to cross-examine the Resp·rndent. 5ince this was the essiot! I 
of Appellants defense acti,.,n t<"l ,..,btain permissi<"ln for certain supeona inform-
ation defendant-Appellant was thus severely penalized, 
ARGUllENT 
POINT I 
Appellant was denied his constitutional rights to a fair trial when the 
Plaintiff-Respondent circumvented the law, practiced fraud up::m the court, misl!li 
the Appellant 'by" use of artifice or trick representing that he need not prepare 
for the hearing as there would be none, siezing a judgment and otherwise general~ JI 
making a nncke;y of justice. 
When Appellant realized he had been deceived by what he thought was a lnyal 1 
brother he immediately objected by u ting the word ''trick" in a request for a neir \ 
trial. The exact happenings of December 13 and 14th 1976 are made available for , 
careful study 
Appella.1t now seeks a new trial based on perjured affidavits before the 
Court and on Newly Discovered Svidence contained in an amendment which was 
rejected by the district judge. 
· 't of This rejection was contrary to the sp1r1 
federal rules of civil proceedure which permits amendmer.ts of a material nature 
to ee accepted " anytime". 
FDINT II 
1'otivation prompting misc,..,nduct of Respondent and other l]~i~ants 
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fatal defect appearing on the face of the m:irtgage. 
Motivated by the fact that acceleration of the entire amount of the L(...,!"tgage 
was contra ry to the terms of the imrtgage and thus improper as a matter of law 
Respondent and other litigants acted to prevent presentation of available defense 
ly Appellant by means of deception and false imprisonment having never invest-
igated claims of Appellant that he was in very deed without means to supp:>rt 
himself durin~ this, his ec'"ln0mic depression. The actions of Respandent on 
December 13th and1.4th 1976 are thought to hccve !teen rrntivated not only by what 
has already been-related mut by a desire to prevent Appellant from seeking and 
obtaining a continuance f0llowin5 his 30 days in ,jail. 
The initial note of May 22, 1972 was exchanged on November 30, 1973 for 
a Mortgage with installment payments and an express provisfon for foreclosure 
upcn default. Thus the parties :rrodified the original note by a sultsequent 
agreement. This subsequent agreement vrhile providing for foreclosure did not 
provide for acceleration of payment upan default • 
. . 
Upan failure to provide for such a right no right exists. In Bank v. 
Boherty 29 Vfash. 233, 69 P. 732 (1902) the Court held that where no provision 
in the contract for accelera tion of principal upon failure to pay interest 
that no right to acceleration and subsequent foreclosure could exist because 
of failure to pay interest. See generally 54 A.L.R. 1230 
In Walker Bank and Trust Company v. Neilson, 26 Utah 2d 383, 490 P. 2d 
328 (1971) this Court said that an acceleration clause was not self-executing, 
but that it was the mortgage optfon to declare the full aJ!l'"lunt due. Since an 
existant accelerati...,n clause cannot operate unless exercised, one certainly 
cannot be impased when it does mt exist. This is an axiom to the propasition 
that there can ee no default until after the amount is due. Thus, the fore-
closure by the Resmndent if proper at all sh...,uld have been limited as a 
matter of law to an action for amounts then owing and should not have been 
allowed for am .... unts not yet due. 
-7-
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POINT III 
, 
A statutory question .;_~ inv-ilved in a waiver or ext ens inn cf t · ime ar,reem•r:. 
submitted as Newly Discovered .C:vidence since it was accepted by Appellant, was 
totally lliplemented, later f0rgntton having eluded th'">rouph search by .~ppellant 
and his family as they s0ught a 11 memoranda, papers, letters and etc. related 
to the case. This particular letter was nnt rerrembered at the trial and was r.ot 
recalled again until it was act,1ally discovered after the trial. 
This Extension of Tllie agreEment appeared in this letter dated January 8, 
1976 and took the form of a new contract or new m,..,dus operandi and the latest 
dated and is thus stated in clear and un uesti,..,nable tE:m.s as f,,llows: "Ne ;·:a,.: 
you to clear up all y·ur del::ts as rapidly as i=ossible, tr,en it will be tfae ,~1 ., 
for you to ~ .i:aying us off." Record P. 129. Three f;10nths later Rescondent 
declared the entire arn-,unt due and subject tri foreclosure. The Appellant was 
surprised and 8ecause of theshort tllie and the am'"lunts accelerated he could not 
then tender the amount due. 
The District Court erred in not holding that by such continual forebearance 
the Respmdent thus waived their right if any existed to accelerate the amriunt 
due and to foreclosre the p:r~operty. 
In American Savings and Loan As soc. v. Blomquist, 21 l'tah 2d 239, 445 P. 2d 
1968. tniS c..,urt said th at waiver of the default may preclude the party from 
acceleration of the indebtedness. Although in that case there was m basis for 
the claim of waiver, but in this case there was substantial evidence tri sh~w that 
the h'esp·mdents did in fact waive the default. The rule expressed by B]Qmci_uist 
supra is that a waiver must be an intenti-inal relinouishment of a kn')Wn right, 
distinctly made expressly or impliedly. 
The letter of January B, 1976, expressly waives the default for the present 
and for sometllie in the future. The frrnr year peri,.,d of fnreuearance with1 ut 
demand, but with reassurances is of itself significant evidence of a waiver. 
The refusal of i;endered paymants or full repavment in 1974 and again 1975 are 
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further evidence of Respondents intent to waive the debt. 
Jn the winter of 1976 a time when the money earned from the fann was spent, 
the Appellant vrns in a position of havi~ relied on the waiver and was unable to 
cure his default after the acceleration was made. The waiver having lteen definite 
then, as a matter of equity and according to Blomquist, supra the Respomlent shoulli. 
have been estopped fr0m accelerating the am'mnts due a"'1d fr<1m thus 9enefiting from 
their past waiver of corr.plaince. Payments were due yearly in V.ay and tev:in,; waived 
them in early 1976 Respondent should have given until llay 1977 before default and 
foreclosure could be sought. The waiver having 9een definite, knowing and inten-
tional there was no right to demand payment at that time, and no right to accelerate 
the debt(had the agreement provided for such a remedy which it did not.) 
This rule is c0nsistent with taat ofother jurisdictions. In Cambell v. Werr.er, 
Fla,2J2 So. 2d (252) (1970) the Court citing cases said: 
The decisions disclose that foreclosure on an accelerated basis may be denied 
where the right to accelerate has been waived or the mortgagee estoppeti to assert it, 
because of conduct of the mortgagee from which the mortgagor, .reasonably could assume 
that the mortgagee, for or upon a certain default, w-,uld n"t elect tn declare the 
full mrtgage indebtedness to be due and payable or forecbse therefor; •••• 
In D•Orazio v Uascianto, 345 Pa. 428, 29 A 2d 4J. (1942) the Cnurt held the 
mortgagee was precluded from foreclooing the m,,rt.gage by a written agreement allow-
ing the principal to be paid when able if the interest were paid. 
Waiver 8y agreement has been found to be effective as to past defauUs or 
to those occuring before notice has been given of an intention to insist upnn 
strict performance in the future, See 148 A.L.R. 686 at 690 citing cases.e.g. 
Lettereri v. Mistretta 102 N.J. Eq 1, 139 A 514 (1927) where an ~ral agreement 
for payment of interest semi- annually instead ofquarterly waived the right to 
require quarterly rayments with~ut giving notice of,b.ntent to insist on strict 
performance. See also 97 A.L.R. 2 d 9 ::J8 at 1007 an d case cited. 
Appellant was given n" notice of an intention t.o depart from the past acts 
of forebearance or from the waiver notice given in the letter ofthat year, Thus, 
there was no right to foreclose 9ased rm the past defaults, those defaults having 
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been waived, 2!1d no n:.tice of stdct perf0rmance in 
payments having been given. 
as 
Extensi0n of Time is binding rin rn0rtgagee and may bee as'ierted by nnrtgag,-. 
\•:ell as by the purchaser of the rn-,rtgaged prriperty wh, has ;issumed the rre. 
gaged debt. 115 A.L.R. lOJK,1054,1055 To give sue h an Extension of Tiir.e 
and then to foreclose is tandamrnnt to fraud 115A. L. R. 1038. This is <:S]:X3cial: 
true where Appellant offered to pa,y the debt, .~ccepted the cxte'lsion, ;icted 8~ 
using his means to ~bide by its terms, 
Dea;and note came due after first default in pgymer.t. 1tet'po:",dent did n~thir 
about it frir f;:n.ir years then before the term nf the mY:ti:;a,r;e the '1esp-mdent tr: 
a newly created situation had a legal right to then and tl-iere foreclose, but 
instead of insisting upan that r:ip,ht, he entered in.to a written concession for 
the pa:;"lilent of the balance due which c0ncessfon c0ntained within itself the so. 
c-,nditions UP'JD which parties on the 0ne side extended and on the nther side 
accepted the c-,ncessions which created a new m'1dus operandi. See 115 .~.L.R. 10)~ 
By such represe:1tation ta the effect that the time to pay was to be extended, ~e 
may not thus take advantage of him by declaring the whole mrtgage due. It w0u~ 
be c0ntrary to ~uity and good c0nscience to allow such a result. This would Ii 
especially true where mortgagor offered to pay the m'1rtgage. See 124 A.L.R. lOll 
Appellant used reasonable diligence to discover and produce evidence at the 
trial. Failure to do so was not the result of negligence and had the newly dis-
covered evidence been before the cnurt in all likeli:.Ood the verdict would have 
been different. 
Due to a series of unav,.,idable circumstances s~rMunding the trial Appellant 
was sc:.rprised, rrd.sled, and acted contrary to what he other1dse would have dnne 
relying on a strong fj.d11ciary and crmfidential relationship to the effect that 
there w-iuld be n'.l f,-,reclnsure and was injured the~eby. 
Under Utah Code Rule 59 (a) an insufficiency of evidence where verdict was 
plainly v.Tong in light of newly discovered evidence sufficient to materially 
affect results in a new trial warrents t;ourt to set aside the verdict judgment 
6 l't~ 
and grant a new trial. People v. Swazer , 6 Utah 93 21P. 400; U.S. v Bro~ 
]1<;_ ?l p 
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f{)INT IV 
Perjured testimony under oath and evidences of misconduct of other litir;ants 
is brought out in the following counter-affidavit befnre the Court. 
"I am pleased that you are taking c,.,nsiderable pride in making your farm 
venture pay off, and especially l':hat Y'">U have d·me with Eoyd l.'a!"l::le •. to get 
everything under Boyd and raise such a fine, large beet cmp. :: surely wish you 
success." See Par 3 of Letter dated January >i, 1Q76 
In c--,nL-ast: "Prbr to January 1976, plaintiffs were aware that defendant 
Noel L. C,,,0k was n,.,t mal'Jaging and farming said real property in such a manner as 
to enable him to pay his debts and plaintiffs did enc,,,urage said defendant to 
J:'IY his other ciebts bef,.,re µi.ying plaintiffs •••• " See par, 12 Respondents Cm:nter Afr: 
Tr.us we see the waiver supported again but two op)Ylsfog p-iints of view, 
Again Appellant represented in reviewing happenings of Jeceml::er 13, 1'176 
that Resp:;ndent reouested bringing the Abstract of Title tn Salt .Lake City 
placing it in th~very hand of Respandent at his office. In Respondents C'">unter-
affidavit he states: "When affiant asked defendants if the;: had brought title 
to their property with them, Noel L. Cook said that he C'.luld n't find it. 11 
This was a perjured statement since it had been discussed earlier that day 
and why the cuesti0n at all if Resp--,ndent had not been inf·nined earlier that 
day as t,., a new course of action and the need for the title. The district court 
totally failed to put together the simplest C<>nstruction which is one main assign-
ed duties of courts of equity when real property ls involved. 
~nother example ofperjured testimnny Respandent said: None of the sums loaned 
by plaintiffs to defendant NoelL. Cook as aforesaid were repaid and on or about 
the 25th of 1'.arch, 1976 plaintiffs filed suit against defendant Noel L. Cook 
and the other parties above named seeking in Count I of their complaint to 
foreclose the m0rtgages referr"lci to in par. 3 and 4 hereof and in Count II 
to collect the amount referred to in paragraphs 5 lierfof •. , See par 6 C!ounter A~f; J., 
Arrounts paid aee on exhibit The latest agreement was a Wrtiver 
or exte:-isi 'n of time. 
Thereafter, plai~ tiffs learned thz-,ugh discussi -,ns with creditl'r'1 of 
Defendant l\nelL, Cook that said defendant was not paying his debts •• " See par,14 c.a. 
Varific_~tion by cancele::i checks should be proof sufficient that 
--
-11-
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money coming to Appellant was \ieing used to pay his bills. 
Resp·mdent wrote: "After the 8th day of January, 19'">6 but before th~ cornm-Jl 
encement ,,f this action, affiant learned that said real p!'">perty was beinl'; sold r 
at a f.,reclnsure sale, whereup,n affiant caused his att,..,:rr.ey tn contact the . l 
att.-,rney f,..,r the party wh., was causi.,g said Jl"l4'erty to ee s•ld and to persuade 
II 
him ••• (toward cnnsolidati.-,n) See par 15 C.A. 
Fact was Appellant told !'tespondent that Fa:r.i.ly Services was foreclosinr 1 
and asked riespondents advice as to what he thought Acpellant sh,.,uld do about it, 
Respondent said: "Tie 1r1 :-:-our property and dnn 't contest the court cases. "Lat;· 
Resp::indent sued all the creditors in on the action to clear the title 
Appellant then borrowed -$1234.00 from the Bear River State 
Bank paying off Fa'llily Services even th-,ugh Appellant had ]'.llid three years longer 
than needed for his daughter Carolyn, and had actually built up a credit. Respind~ 
then said ab0ut the payment to family services "'::hy did you do that ? 11 
Problems which Res)J'"'ndent encountered and discussed in paragraphs 22 and 2)r 
his counter-affidavit are tmse which Resinndent shrrnld have W•rked out ahead of 
the ann"uncement that "There would be no f,.,recl,.,sure," '!'he fact that it did not 
work out for Respondent was n.-,t the fault of the Appellant but defendant had put 
his trust in the promises dismissing his c•uncil supP"lrted by Res pendent to do so 
resulting in i1.9ury and harm to his cause and hardship in making a living. 
No attempt at settlement either in Salt .Lake City or at the court house as 
far as Appellant was involved was given. Appellant was excluded and any discussiou 
going on were behind closed doors. See par. 29 C'1<mter--affidavit. ResP"ndent pho~/ 
an attorney to represent Appellant v:hen he arrived at the Court House, but this 
attorney was not lnformed as to facts and Appellant was stipulated to facts 
adverse to his case and c,.,ntrary to his pleadings. 
POINT IV 
EVIDENCE THAT OTHER LITIGANTS KNE/i OF FATAL DEFECT AND ACTi':D 'ID Hil-1DER APPELLANT 1 
Attorney for Vera o. Cook 'P'ho was himself to profit by the foreclosure and 
d~llars of the settlement round ii now has personally received some seven th,.,usand ., 
-12- d 
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~ 1 appropr"1ate time to jail Appellant immediately before the trial for th~; days. 
gspecially where it is the duty of an attorney to !mow the strengths and the weak-
nesses of a contract some concern should lie involved in m-itive in this case. The 
words used by this attorney before the district judge of the case was that Noel L. 
Cook was hiding money. He knew this to be false when he r.:ade it. 
Another litigant Smith Vs Cook there is fraud involved in State Farm Ins. 
Group claiming th0usands of d0llars in medical and dental bills fMm a c,.,llisfon 
v:here ~.r s Smith ran bmadside intn the pick-up truck of Appellant t--talling it out 
v'\en it was i'inked f0r .$25.00 • This sh--uld be looked up-rn with suspician w'ien in 
fact !!rs. Smith said at eite 0f wreckage and collisi,.,n: "Let's each take care of 
0 i;r -,vrn d-mage since n0 one has been hurt and fog pnve:-ited eac11 nne of us fr,,m 
seeing the other. 11 
P01NT V 
Divorce decreee provided no lien on the real property in this acti-m and a judgment 
should mt be permitted to determi11e the contract or supercede it. Vera O. Cook took 
her lien on other property which she and Appellant acquired together. 
The ,judgment by the lower court for child suPP"rt when visitation rights are 
denied and when father is withriut income was improper. 
Appellant has geen without sufficient income to provide for himself since the 
entry of her divorce which she alone wanted when A ppellant lost his teaching jolt. 
The district c,.,urt nevertheless granted a judgment for support for the period of 
the last judgment to the time of the trial. Appellant denied that he had sufficient 
income to pay the suppart payments of .jpl00,00 per IIr>nth. 
The inability to be a8le to make payments because of lack of income is a proper 
basis for excusing contempt or for reducing the amount of supp,-,rt to be paid. For 
ex.ample, in MacDonald v Superior Court, 40 Cal. APP 2d 517,104 P. 2d 1071(1940) 
the Court ordered the trial Court to hear such rrnti-m 'based on the fact that the 
husband was unemployed while the wife was employed with a satisfactory income. This 
rule has been follow~d in a ma.iririty ,..,f cases. See 6 A.L. R. 2d BL 5 
-13-
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There are numer-,us IJtah cases dealing with the authority of th~-::..,ur'.: to 
reduce supp:irt decrees fo acc":-dance with the pmvisi'"lns of U.C.A, (1953) ~ 3~,.· 
when there are chani:;ed circumstances • .3ee e.g. Colum~o v ,·;2lker f'a:-ik anc '.':-u,v 
------.:... 
26 Utah 2d 350, 4R9 P 2d 998 ( 197 l); Peters v Peters 15 Utah 2d 413, 394 p, ;~ 
71 (1964) 
In Earl v t:arl 17 Utah 2d l5b,406 P. 2d 302 (1%5) this C>urt s:iid th 2t ~: 
proper circumstances 2 Cnurt might make payments for SUN"rt depc:ndent up:in a c 
custodian making the child available for visitati~n rir,hts, 
In this case, the Hesp-wdent Vera o. Cnok (Baacher) wife, h:o.s arbitr•ril;.· 
refused SUll'Jner visitation rights given by div0rce decree for Up to six weeks, 
Appellant father. In addition, other rights of visitation were refused based:· 
a claimed need for prior n0tice, under such circumstances theCourt erred in:·: 
Bxcusing the failure to pay. This is particularly so where the ex-wife is wel. 
empl,.,yed while the father is heavily in debt and unable tn 0 btain sufficie:it ir.c. 
fr..,m his fann to meet his own needs, 
FOJNT VI 






Judge refused to ace ept an only amendment which vinlates 
the spirit of the federal rules of civil pll:lceedure, 
At no time was Appellant permitted to take the •dtness stand to 
present an available defense. 
The judge refused the Appellant opp:Jrtunity sought to cr-iss-exa: 
the Res pendent in set-E:s lde hearing on fraud wi. thaut a jury whe'.' 
the sole purp-,se was t0 obtnin permission of ctesinndent forcer-
supeona information essential to his defense. 
The judge ll!ade little effort at simple c'>nstruction of circUJ!l-
stanti al evidence in pcssible fraud vrhich violates the principal 
duty of ccurts of eciuity dealing with real pmperty. 
Early in the h earing the judge stated that he.was r:ady at 0H~: time to rule on the case thus p'"li:iting up ~ssible bias, pr-.iu · 
and which he was not able to overcome. 
This judge was well acauai'lted with the Appellant 
-l/4-
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Sliis~rict Cnurt in Cl,an, Utah by all the dncketed claims except one agam~t him. 
Due to indigency anC. negative ratin;: i:;h·en by a litigant Credit Bureau ,.,f Vii:;an 
Appellants financial ability was imp;iired p->inting up a weakness of our Court 
system. This resulted in bias of the judge toward the rlppellant. 
Under Utah Rules of Civil froceedure Rule 59 New Trials: Amendments of 
judgments the grounds for a tfow Trial are set forth. 
( 1) Irregularity in the prcceedings nf the c,.,urt, jury or 
2 dverse party, or any order of the court to abuse of di2cretion by v!J!iich either 
party was prevented frnm having a fair trial. 
[,ave gcarC.ed ai;ainst. 
( 4) Newly di~overed evidence, material for the party rr!iking 
the application which he could not, with reas,.,nable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at trial. 
Appellant presented to theTrial Court evidence of his detention in jail 
o:-. contempt prior to the hearing, of Respondents false representation of settle-
ment, of his inability to participate at the trial, in his inadequate attempt to 
represent hi1nself, and further evidence ofthe Resp->ndent•s waiver of compliance 
Vlith the terms of the mortgage. 
The pr oper presentation of this evide!lce at a new trial would have presented 
to the Court the question of whether Res]X>ndent waived his rights to accelerate 
and foreclose. The evidence shnwed that the failure t,., properly present this 
issue was due to Appellant's last minute atten;pt to obtain an attorney and his 
lack of preparation. He tried unsuccessfully to obtain said C'">uncil while in 
jail as evidenced by a call to a Clearfield, Utah Att'"> mey who refused for econ-
orr.ic reasons. The poor presentation was due to the short time between trial 
and his release from .iail and suggestions of settlement which caused Appellant , 
already pressed for money to release his attorney obtained December 10, 1976 
or one bcsiness day bef,,re the trial doing this with the statement of ResP'.Jndent 
saying: "You might as well release him." 
-15-
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The Court with this evidence constituted "Irregularity :i.·n th 
epruc eedings of 
the Court.. by which •• (a) party was prevented from l:aving a fair trial. 11 
Furthermore, the letter of January 8, 1976,made definite allegatinns of 
forebearance that were otherwise mere allegations my Appellant. Thus under sub. 
division (4) of Rule 59 the new evidence presented made a material difference in 
the case since this was Appellant's main defense. 
In V.an Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank , 48 Utah 606, 161 P. 50 ( 1916) u-.e Court 
said that where such evidence makes clear that which, without it, v;c_s obscure and 
extremely doubtful, especially where it is direct •.•. then a new trial srould be 
awarded. In this case the letter t0 Appellant fr"m ":espondent Vias direct evidenci, 
o:f past waivers which vrere material part of Appellant's defense. 
Un.!'ortunately this evidence was not properly presented to the trial Court. 
Such a failure was excuseable where it was caused by misrepresentations by the 
other party that there w:::n.;ld be no f,.,reclosure and that there wculd be a'lother ploi! 
of repayment and where the Court was fully aware of Appellants inadequate represent 
ation of his case and need to obtain proper council; 
Appellant should be av;arded Att0mey 1 s fee necessary to bring this appeal. 
In Swain v Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment Co., 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P 2d 
709 (1955) this ·Court said that the awarding of attorney's fees on appeal is dis-
cretinnary with the C"urt. Such discretion is to be exercised in light of the 
equities of the case. 
Appellant has been forced todo witl:out proper representation because of lack 
of income 'l'rhile being charged with the attrirney's fees for the Resp:mdents. 
The little money he had, being inthe land to be foreclosed, Appella'1t was f orced 
by the terms of the c0ntract to finanee his foreclosure when he couldn •t borrow 
enough money to cure default or defend himself had he been given the op)X)rtunity. 
· and unlawful Based on the argument of Appellant setting forth the llllproper 
y'sl 
nature of Respondents foreclosure, the Appellant asks the C0urt to award att1Jrne ' 
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C0NCLUSION 
In the set-aside of judgment on hearing on fraud without jury the judge 
and trial court erred in pre-announcement that judgment would be by affidavit 
only, The judge stated early in the hearing that he was at that time prepared 
tn rule on the case thus i:ointing out a pre-judgment prompted by prejudice. 
Appellant was denied acceptance of an o~:y amendment, 
permitted to cross-examine the Respondent and was denied opportunity to 
tt0stify. 
Appellant was clearly misled due mainly to a reliance on a strong fid-
uciary and brotherly relationship where wrongdoing was easily accomplished. 
As a matter of law trial court erred in allowing Respondent to accelerate 
pl yments and toforeclosi: when there was no provision :in the mnrtgage for it. 
Newly discovered evidence must be heard in the district court where it is 
material and holds a possibility of reversal. 
Tortfeasor activity permeates the entire case nntivated by error affect:ing 
substantial and constitutional rights of Appellant adversely. 
F:inally the trial court erred in awarding judgment for supPJrt to 
Respondent Vera O. Cook ( Baacher) when Appellant was without income and was 
being denied his proper visitation rights. 
Right of all parties intermingled with injustice and interdependant due 
to tort activity and the need to protect deed of trust fnr benefit of the 
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